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Abstract
Shah, Rashmi and Ramchandran recently considered a model for Private Infor-
mation Retrieval (PIR) where a user wishes to retrieve one of several R-bit messages
from a set of n non-colluding servers. Their security model is information-theoretic.
Their paper is the first to consider a model for PIR in which the database is not
necessarily replicated, so allowing distributed storage techniques to be used. They
concentrate on minimising the total number of bits downloaded from the servers.
Shah et al. provide a construction of a scheme that requires just R + 1 bits to be
downloaded from servers, but requires an exponential (in R) number of servers.
We provide an improved scheme that requires a linear number of servers. Shah et
al. construct a scheme with linear total storage (in R) that needs at least 2R bits
to be downloaded. For any positive , we provide a construction with the same
storage property, that requires at most (1 + )R bits to be downloaded; moreover
one variant of our scheme only requires each server to store a bounded number of
bits (in the sense of being bounded by a function that is independent of R). Fi-
nally, we simplify and generalise a lower bound due to Shah et al. on the download
complexity of such a PIR scheme. In a natural model, we show that an n-server
PIR scheme requires at least nR/(n− 1) download bits, and provide a scheme that
meets this bound.
1 Introduction
Shah, Rashmi and Ramchandran [11] provide bounds on the data downloaded from
servers in an interesting variant of the private information retrieval model. The aim
of this paper is to study this model further, improving and generalising their schemes
and bounds.
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1.1 The PIR Model
In the classical model for private information retrieval (PIR) [5], a database X is replicated
across n servers S1, S2, . . . , Sn. A user wishes to retrieve one bit of the database, so sends
a query to each server and downloads their reply. The user should be able to deduce
the bit from the servers’ replies. Moreover, no single server should gain any information
on which bit the user wishes to retrieve (without collusion). The resulting protocol is
known as (an information-theoretic) PIR scheme; there are also computational variants
of the security model. The goal of PIR is normally to minimise the total communication
between the user and the servers.
The variant of this model due to Shah et al. is closer to what might be implemented
in practice. They assume that each database X consists of k records, each of which is R
bits in length, so that the number of possible databases is 2kR. We denote the ith record
by Ri, and we write Xij for the jth bit of the ith record. The aim of the protocol is for
the user to retrieve some record Rj, rather than a single bit. Importantly, Shah et al. do
not assume the whole database is replicated across the n servers S1, S2, . . . , Sn and so, in
particular, there is the possibility of using techniques from distributed storage to reduce
the total storage of the scheme. We make no restrictions on the particular encoding used
to distribute the database across the servers other than to assume it is deterministic, i.e.
that there is a unique way to encode each database. This important generalisation of the
model has led to very interesting recent work which we discuss in Subsection 1.3 below.
More combinatorially, we define a private information retrieval scheme as follows.
Definition 1.1 (PIR scheme). Suppose a database X is distributed across n servers
S1, S2, . . . , Sn. A user who wishes to learn the value of record Rj submits a query
(q1, q2, . . . , qn). For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, server Si receives qi and responds with a
value ci that depends on qi and on the information stored by Si. The user receives the
response (c1, c2, . . . , cn). This system is a private information retrieval (PIR) scheme if
the following two properties are satisfied:
(Privacy) For i = 1, 2, . . . , n the value qi received by server Si reveals no information
about which record is being sought.
(Correctness) Given a response (c1, c2, . . . , cn) to a query (q1, q2, . . . , qn) for record Rj,
the user is unambiguously able to recover the value of record Rj.
Note that while the query is drawn randomly according a pre-specified distribution
on a set of potential queries, the response is assumed to be deterministic.
Example 1.1. In the case of a single server, a trivial method for achieving PIR is for
the user to download the entire kR-bit database.
Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz and Sudan showed that in the case of single-bit records
(R = 1), if there is a single server then PIR is only possible if the total communication is
at least k bits (i.e. the size of the entire database) [5], and so the solution above is best
possible. We are interested in finding solutions such as the scheme below, in which the
user downloads significantly less than kR bits from the servers:
Example 1.2. [5] Suppose there are two servers, each storing the entire database. Sup-
pose R = 1.
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• A user who requires record Rj chooses a k-bit string (α1, α2, . . . , αk) uniformly at
random.
• Server 1 is requested to return the value c1 =
⊕k
i=1 αiRi, and Server 2 is requested
to return c2 =
(⊕k
i=1 βiRi
)
, where
βi =
{
αi ⊕ 1 when i = j,
αi otherwise.
• The user computes c1 ⊕ c2 to recover the value of Rj.
The strings (α1, α2, . . . , αk) and (β1, β2, . . . , βk) are both uniformly distributed, and
are independent of the choice of j, hence neither server receives any information as to
which record is being recovered by the user.
We note that the scheme above works unchanged when the records are R-bit strings
rather than single bits. The download complexity, in other words the total number of
bits downloaded from servers, is 2R. The following is a formalisation of the notion of
download complexity used by Shah et al. [11].
Definition 1.2. A PIR scheme uses binary channels if the response cj sent by server
Sj is a binary string of length dj, where dj depends only on the query qj it receives.
The download complexity is the maximum of the sum
∑n
j=1 dj over all possible queries
(q1, q2, . . . , qn).
We emphasise that the length dj in the definition above does not depend on the
database X, but could depend on the query qj received by server Sj. We note that we
allow for the possibility that dj = 0, so the server does not reply to the query. Finally,
we note that if we know that there are more than 2x distinct possibilities for cj as the
database varies, we may deduce that dj ≥ x+ 1.
The storage requirements of a PIR scheme are of great interest:
Definition 1.3. Suppose server Si stores si bits of information about the database X.
• The per-server storage of the scheme is max{si | i = 1, 2, . . . , n}.
• The total storage of the scheme is ∑ni=1 si.
1.2 Results
The main results in [11] may be stated as follows:
• A proof that a PIR scheme (in the model above) must have download complexity
at least R + 1 when k ≥ 2.
• An explicit PIR scheme that has download complexity R+ 1. This scheme requires
an exponential (in R) number of servers, and so has exponential total storage.
• An explicit PIR scheme that has linear (in R) total storage, and a download com-
plexity of between 2R and 4R (so is within a constant factor of optimality).
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The paper also contains the claim that a scheme of download complexity R + 1 cannot
have total storage that is linear in R, but no proof of this claim is given.
This paper contains analogues of, and improvements on, each of these results:
• In Section 2 we provide a more general lower bound on download complexity than
the bound in [11]. In particular, the new bound implies that an n-server PIR scheme
must have download complexity at least n
n−1R when k is sufficiently large.
• In Subsection 3.1, we provide a simple R + 1-server PIR scheme with download
complexity R + 1 that has total storage which is quadratic in R.
• In Subsection 3.2, we describe an n-server PIR scheme with optimal download
complexity n
n−1R. The total storage of the scheme is linear in R. This shows that
for any  > 0 there exists a PIR scheme with linear total storage and download
complexity at most (1 + )R. We also describe (Subsection 3.3) a similar scheme
that provides a trade-off between increasing the number of servers and reducing the
per-server storage of the scheme.
1.3 Context
We end this introduction with a brief discussion of some of the related literature.
Private information retrieval was introduced in [5], and has been an active area ever
since. See, for example, Yekhanin [17] for a fairly recent survey.
The papers by Shah et al. [11] and (independently) by Augot, Levy-Dit-Vahel, and
Shikfa [1] are the first to consider PIR models where the information stored by servers
could be coded using techniques from distributed storage. Whereas [11] is mainly con-
cerned with download complexity, and also with total storage (with per-server storage,
and query size also relevant parameters), the paper [1] emphasises robustness against ma-
licious servers. The latter paper takes the total storage into account, but also emphasises
other related robustness parameters: decoder locality and PIR locality.
Fazeli, Vardy, and Yaakobi [8] show how to use an object they call a PIR code (more
generally a PIR array code) to provide a trade-off between the number of servers and
the total storage. In particular, for all  > 0, they show that there exist good schemes
(in terms of communication requirements) where the amount of information stored in a
server is bounded but the total storage is at most (1 + ) times the database size. Rao
and Vardy [10] study these codes further, with a lower bound on the redundancy of these
PIR codes; see also Blackburn and Etzion [2].
We remark that though it is possible to reduce total storage using the techniques of
PIR array codes, it seems impossible to reduce the download complexity of the resulting
schemes below (3/2)R (and most codes give download complexity close to 2R) because
of restrictions on the PIR rate of such codes.
Fanti and Ramchandran [6, 7] consider unsynchronized databases; the results are the
same as for synchronized PIR at the expense of probabilistic success for information
retrieval obtained after two rounds of communication.
Chan, Ho, and Yamamoto [3, 4] consider the tradeoff between the total storage and
download complexity when the size of a record is large; the tradeoff depends on the
number of records in the system.
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In a sequence of papers, Sun and Jafar [12, 13, 14] consider the capacity of channels
related to PIR codes in various scenarios, including the presence of colluding servers.
Finally, Tajeddine and El Rouayeb [15, 16] consider PIR schemes where the informa-
tion is stored using MDS codes. They give PIR algorithms which have optimal download
complexity in this model, as they attain the bounds in [3], in the situation when one or
two ‘spies’ (colluding malicious servers) are present.
2 Lower bounds on Download Complexity
Shah, Rashmi and Ramchandran [11] show that a PIR scheme must have download
complexity at least R+1 when k ≥ 2. Here we provide an alternative approach to proving
this fact, and prove some more general results that will show our later constructions are
optimal in terms of download complexity.
Throughout this section, we assume we have fixed an n-server PIR scheme, and con-
sider its performance over all possible databases consisting of k records of length R.
Definition 2.1. We say that a response (c1, c2, . . . , cn) is possible for a query (q1, q2, . . . , qn)
if there exists a database X for which (c1, c2, . . . , cn) is returned as the response to the
query (q1, q2, . . . , qn) when X is stored by the servers.
The number of possible responses to a given query over all possible databases deter-
mines the amount of information that is downloaded by the user. This is a parameter of a
PIR scheme that we would like to minimise. Similarly, we would like to minimise the size
of each query, and the total amount of data stored by the servers. It is also important to
consider the complexity of the computations required by both the user and the servers
in carrying out a PIR scheme.
2.1 General bounds
We begin with a theorem that essentially shows that when a server knows that no more
than i bits (where 0 ≤ i ≤ R) will be downloaded from the other servers, then it must
reply with at least k(R − i) bits of download. Without loss of generality we will focus
on server S1, so for ease of notation we will denote the tuple (q1, q2, . . . , qn) by (q1, qother),
and (c1, c2, . . . , cn) by (c1, cother).
Theorem 2.1. Suppose 0 ≤ i ≤ R. Let q1 be fixed. Suppose we have a PIR scheme with
the property that for any query of the form (q1, qother), we have
|{cother | ∃c1 such that (c1, cother) is possible for (q1, qother)}| ≤ 2i.
Then for any query (q1, q
′
other) we have
|{c1 | ∃cother such that (c1, cother) is possible for (q1, q′other)}| ≥ 2k(R−i).
Proof. Let q1 be fixed, and suppose we have a PIR scheme with the property that for
any query (q1, qother)
|{cother | ∃c1 such that (c1, cother) is possible for (q1, qother)}| ≤ 2i.
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Assume, for a contradiction, that there exists a query (q1, q
∗
other) corresponding to some
record Rj for which
|{c1 | ∃cother such that (c1, cother) is possible for (q1, q∗other)}| < 2k(R−i).
There are 2kR databases, and less than 2k(R−i) possibilities for the reply c1 of S1 to
the (q1, q
∗
other). So by the pigeon-hole principle, there is a value c
∗
1 for which there exists a
set T of databases with |T | > 2kR/2k(R−i) = 2ki having the property that for each X ∈ T ,
the response of S1 to (q1, q
∗
other) when the servers store X is c
∗
1. If server S1 receives the
query q1, it will thus return c
∗
1 whenever a database in T is being stored.
Since the databases consist of k records, the fact that |T | > 2ki implies the exis-
tence of a record R` for which the number of distinct values for record R` that appear
among the databases in T is greater than 2i. Thus we can choose a set of databases
W = {X1,X2, . . .X2i+1} ⊆ T such that no two databases in W have the same value for
record R`.
The requirement for privacy against server S1 implies that if (q1, q
∗
other) is a query for
record Rj, then there exists a query for record R` of the form (q1, q
`
other), since otherwise
S1 could distinguish between queries for Rj and queries for R`. If query (q1, q
`
other) is made
when a database in T is stored, then server S1 receives q1 and responds c
∗
1 as before. Now
consider the databases in W . As there are 2i + 1 of them, yet at most 2i values for cother
for which there is a possible response (c∗1, cother) to (q1, q
`
other), it follows that there must
be some value c`other for which there are two databases X,Y ∈ W such that the response
to (q1, q
`
other) is (c
∗
1, c
`
other) when either of those databases is stored. This contradicts the
correctness of Σ, since X and Y do not agree in record R` yet the response (c
∗
1, c
`
other) to
the query (q1, q
`
other) does not allow the user to distinguish between them.
The theorem is a generalisation of the lower bound on download complexity due to
Chor et al.:
Corollary 2.2. [5, Theorem 5.1] A PIR scheme that uses a single server for a database
with k records of size one bit is not possible unless the number of possible responses from
the server to any given query is at least 2k.
Proof. Set i = 0 and R = 1 in Theorem 2.1.
2.2 Bounds when using binary channels
Recall the definition of a PIR scheme using binary channels from the introduction. We
now restrict our attention to such schemes, and provide lower bounds on the download
complexity.
Theorem 2.3. Let x be non-negative, and suppose we have a PIR scheme using binary
channels that has total download complexity at most R + x. If the database contains k
records, where k ≥ x+2, then the number of bits downloaded from any server is at most x.
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider the server S1. Suppose for a contradiction
that there is a query q1 sent to S1, where S1 replies with x + 1 or more bits. Let i be
the maximum number of bits downloaded by the remaining servers in reply to a query
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of the form (q1, qother). Since the total download complexity is at most R + x, we find
that 0 ≤ i ≤ (R + x) − (x + 1) ≤ R − 1. Since the reply cother of the other servers to
any query of the form (q1, qother) can be expressed by a string of at most i bits, there
are at most 2i possibilities for cother when a query of the form (q1, qother) is made. So the
conditions of Theorem 2.1 are now satisfied, and we can deduce that there are at least
2k(R−i) possible replies c1 of S1 to the query q1. In particular, at least k(R − i) bits are
downloaded from S1.
Let q′other be chosen so that i bits are downloaded from the other servers when the
query (q1, q
′
other) is made. Then the number of bits downloaded from all servers in this
situation is at least k(R− i) + i. But
k(R−i)+i = kR−(k−1)i ≥ kR−(k−1)(R−1) = R+k−1 ≥ R+(x+2)−1 = R+x+1,
which is impossible as the scheme has total download complexity R+x. This contradiction
establishes the theorem.
Corollary 2.4. [11] Let the database contain k records with k ≥ 2. Any PIR scheme
using binary channels requires a total download of at least R + 1 bits.
Proof. Suppose we have a scheme with total download of R or fewer bits. Theorem 2.3
with x = 0 implies that no server downloads non-trivially, and so the user receives no
information about the desired record. Hence such a scheme cannot exist.
Theorem 2.5. Suppose a PIR scheme uses binary channels and involves n servers,
where n ≥ 2. Suppose the database contains k records, where k ≥ d 1
n−1Re+ 1. Then the
download complexity of the scheme is at least n
n−1R bits.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that the scheme has download complexity R+x, where
x is an integer such that x < 1
n−1R. Since x ≤ d 1n−1Re − 1, we see that k ≥ x + 2 and
so Theorem 2.3 implies that the number of bits downloaded by any server is at most x.
Since we have n servers, the total number of bits of download is always at most xn. Since
our scheme has download complexity R+ x, there is a query where a total of R+ x bits
are downloaded from servers. Hence we must have that nx ≥ R + x, which implies that
x ≥ 1
n−1R. This contradiction establishes the result.
The final two results of this section concentrate on the extreme case when the down-
load complexity is exactly R + 1.
Corollary 2.6. Let the database contain k records with k ≥ 3. Any PIR scheme using
binary channels with a total download of exactly R+1 bits requires 1 bit to be downloaded
from each of R or R + 1 different servers in response to any query.
Proof. The special case of Theorem 2.3 when x = 1 shows that no server replies with
more than 1 bit. For the download complexity to be R + 1, no more than R + 1 servers
can respond non-trivially. Since the user deduces the value of an R-bit record from the
bits it has downloaded, at least R servers must reply.
One might hope that the Corollary 2.6 could be strengthened to the statement that
exactly R + 1 servers must respond non-trivially. However, examples show that this is
not always the case: see the comments after Construction 1 below.
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Shah et al. state [11, Theorem 1] that, in the situation above, “for almost every PIR
operation” R+1 servers must respond, and they provide a heuristic argument to support
this statement. The following result makes this rigorous, with a precise definition of
‘almost every’.
Theorem 2.7. Let the database contain k records with k ≥ 3. Suppose we have a PIR
scheme using binary channels with a total download of exactly R+ 1 bits. Suppose a user
chooses to retrieve a record chosen with a uniform probability distribution on {1, 2, . . . , k}.
Let α be the probability that only R bits are downloaded. Then
α ≤ R + 1
kR + 1
.
Proof. By Corollary 2.6, each server replies to any query with at most one bit. We may
assume, without loss of generality, that if a server replies with one bit then this bit must
depend on the database in some way (since otherwise we may modify the scheme so that
this server does not reply and the probability α will increase).
Let (q1, q2, . . . , qn) be a query for the record R` where only R servers reply non-trivially.
Since only R servers reply, there are at most 2R possible replies to the query (over all
databases). But the value of R` is determined by the reply, and there are 2
R possible
values of R`. So in fact there must be exactly 2
R possible replies, and there is a bijection
between possible replies and possible values of R`. We claim that the replies of each of
these R servers can only depend on the record R`, not on the rest of the database. To see
this, suppose a server Sj replies non-trivially, and let f : {0, 1}kR → {0, 1} be the function
mapping each possible value of the database to the reply of Sj to query qj. Suppose f is
not a function of R` alone, so there are two values X and X
′ of the database that agree
on R` such that f(X) 6= f(X′). Let ρ be the common value of R` in both X and X′.
When R` = ρ there are at least two possible replies to the query, depending on the value
of the remainder of the database. But this contradicts the fact that we have a bijection
between possible replies and possible values of R`. So our claim follows.
Let A be the event that exactly R servers reply, and for j = 1, 2, . . . , n let Bj be the
event that server Sj replies non-trivially. Let Dj be the indicator random variable for the
event Bj. So Dj is equal to 1 when Sj responds non-trivially and 0 otherwise. Note that
Dj is always equal to the number of bits downloaded from Sj, thus the expected value of
the sum of these variables satisfies
E
(
n∑
j=1
Dj
)
= αR + (1− α)(R + 1) = R + 1− α. (1)
Let D′j be the indicator random variable for the event A ∧ Bj. When A does not occur,
all the variables D′j are equal to 0. When A occurs, D
′
j is the number of bits downloaded
from server Sj and a total of R bits are downloaded. So
E
(
n∑
j=1
D′j
)
= (1− α)0 + αR = αR. (2)
Suppose a server Sj uses the following strategy to guess the value of ` from the query
qj it receives. If the server replies non-trivially using a function f that depends on only
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one record R`′ it guesses that ` = `
′. Otherwise, the server guesses a value uniformly at
random. The server guesses correctly with probability 1/k when it responds trivially. The
argument in the paragraph above shows the server always guesses correctly if it responds
non-trivially and only R servers reply. Thus the server is correct with probability at
least (1/k) Pr(Bj) + Pr(A ∧ Bj). The privacy requirement of the PIR scheme implies
that the server’s probability of success can be at most 1/k, and so we must have that
Pr(A ∧Bj) ≤ (1/k) Pr(Bj). Hence
E(D′j) ≤ (1/k)E(Dj).
By linearity of expectation, we see that
E
(
n∑
j=1
D′j
)
=
n∑
j=1
E(D′j) ≤
1
k
n∑
j=1
E(Dj) =
1
k
E
(
n∑
j=1
Dj
)
.
So, using (1) and (2), we see that
αR ≤ 1
k
(R + 1− α).
Rearranging this inequality in terms of α, we see that the theorem follows.
3 Constructions
Recall the notation from the introduction: we are assuming that our database X consists
of k records, each of R bits, and we write Xij for the ith bit of the ith record.
3.1 A scheme with download complexity R + 1
Shah et al. [11, Section IV] provide a PIR scheme which achieves an optimal download
complexity of R+1. However, their scheme uses an exponential (in R) number of servers,
and so has exponential total storage. The following construction, which can be thought
of as a variation of the scheme of Chor et al. described in Example 1.2, achieves optimal
download complexity using only R + 1 servers. It has a total storage requirement which
is quadratic in R.
Construction 1. The following scheme is an R + 1-server PIR scheme with download
complexity R + 1. All servers store the whole database.
• A user who requires record R` creates a k × R array of bits by drawing its entries
αij uniformly and independently at random.
• Server R + 1 is requested to return the bit cR+1 =
⊕k
i=1
⊕R
j=1 αijXij.
• For r = 1, 2, . . . , R, server r is requested to return the bit cr =
⊕k
i=1
⊕R
j=1 βijXij,
where
βij =
{
αij ⊕ 1 if i = ` and j = r,
αi,j otherwise.
9
• To recover the rth bit of record R` the user computes cr ⊕ cR+1.
We note that privacy is guaranteed since each server is asked for a uniformly random
linear combination of bits from the database. The construction requires R + 1 bits of
download, which is optimal by Corollary 2.4. It requires R+ 1 copies of the database to
be stored, hence has total storage of (R + 1)Rk bits. The scheme in Shah et al. requires
(R+ 1)k−1 servers, and has total storage (R+ 1)k−1R bits, and so the construction above
is significantly better in both these metrics. However, the scheme of Shah at al has better
per server storage, as each server stores just R bits: our construction requires each server
to store the whole database.
We note that there are situations where one of the servers is asked for an all-zero
linear combination of bits from the database. In this case, that server need not reply.
So the number of bits of downloaded in Construction 1 is sometimes R (though usually
R + 1 bits are downloaded). See the comment following Corollary 2.6.
In this paper, we are not aiming to optimise the number of bits uploaded to servers.
Nevertheless, we provide a construction with a lower upload complexity than the schemes
above. The construction can be thought of as a variant of Construction 1 where the rows
of the array α are all taken from a restricted set {e0, e1, . . . , eR} of size R + 1. A similar
idea is used in the constructions in [11].
For i = 1, 2, . . . , R, let ei be the i
th unit vector of length R. Let e0 be the all zero
vector. For binary vectors x and y of length R, write x · y be their inner product; so
x · y = ⊕Rj=1xjyj.
Construction 2. The following scheme is an R + 1-server PIR scheme with download
complexity R + 1, and reduced upload complexity. All servers store the whole database.
• A user who requires record R` chooses k elements a1, a2, . . . , ak ∈ ZR+1 uniformly
and independently at random. For r = 1, . . . , R + 1, Server r is sent the vector
br = (b1r, b2r, . . . , bkr) ∈ ZkR+1, where
bir =
{
ai + r mod R + 1 if i = `,
ai otherwise.
• Server r returns the bit cr =
⊕k
i=1 ebir ·Rj.
• To recover the jth bit of record R`, the user finds the integers r and r′ such that
b`r = 0 and b`r′ = j. The user then computes cr ⊕ cr′.
The upload complexity becomes (R+ 1)kdlog2(R+ 1)e, significantly smaller than the
upload complexity of (R + 1)kR in Construction 1.
3.2 Optimal download complexity for a small number of servers
For an integer n such that (n − 1) | R, we now describe an n server PIR scheme with
download complexity n
n−1R bits. By Theorem 2.5, this construction provides schemes
with an optimal download complexity for n servers, provided the number k of records is
sufficiently large. This construction is closely related to Construction 1 above.
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Construction 3. Let n be an integer such that (n− 1) | R. The following scheme is an
n-server PIR scheme with download complexity n
n−1R bits.
• A user who requires record R` creates R/(n − 1) arrays of bits, each array of size
k ×R, by drawing their entries αuij uniformly and independently at random.
• Server n is asked to return the R/(n− 1)-bit string cR+1, where bit u of this string
is equal to
⊕k
i=1
⊕R
j=1 α
u
ijXij.
• For r = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, server r is asked to return an R/(n − 1)-bit string cr. Bit
u of cr is equal to
⊕k
i=1
⊕R
j=1 β
u
ijXij, where
βuij =
{
αuij ⊕ 1 if i = ` and j = (r − 1)(R/(n− 1)) + u,
αuij otherwise.
• The user recovers the first R/(n − 1) bits of R` by computing c1 ⊕ cn, the next
R/(n− 1) bits of R` by computing c2 ⊕ cn and so on.
Privacy is guaranteed since each server is asked to return R/(n − 1) independent
uniformly random linear combinations of bits from the database. Each server in this
construction stores the whole database, so the total storage of these schemes is nRk.
Thus the total storage is linear in R.
Shah et al. [11, Section V] provide PIR schemes with linear (in R) total storage
and with download complexity between 2R and 4R. Their scheme requires a number of
servers which is independent of R (but is linear in k). The construction above (taking
n to be fixed but sufficiently large) shows that for any fixed positive  a PIR scheme
with linear total storage exists with download complexity of (1 + )R: this is within an
arbitrarily close factor of optimality. Moreover, the number of servers in our construction
is independent of both k and R. However, note that in our scheme each server stores the
whole database, whereas the per server storage of the scheme of Shah et al. is a fixed
multiple of R.
3.3 Schemes with small per-server storage
We make the observation that the last construction may be used to give families of
schemes with lower per-server storage; see [11, Section V] for similar techniques.
Construction 4. Let s be a fixed integer such that s | R. Let r be a fixed integer such
that (r − 1) | s. Let n = r(R/s). The following scheme is an n-server PIR scheme with
download complexity r
r−1R bits.
• Divide each record into R/s chunks of s bits each. Divide the database into R/s
parts of ks bits, the ith part containing the ith chunk of each record.
• Operate R/s copies of the PIR scheme of Construction 3 independently. Each copy
uses r servers; no server is used in two copies of the scheme. The ith copy of the
scheme operates on the ith part of the database only (and so each server needs to
store just one part of the database).
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The download complexity of this PIR scheme is R
s
r
r−1s =
r
r−1R bits. Each server
stores just ks bits. The total storage requirements of the scheme is nks = rkR. By fixing
r and s to be sufficiently large integers, we can see that for all positive  we have a family
of schemes with download complexity at most (1 + )R, with total storage linear in the
database size, with a linear (in R) number of servers, and where the per server storage
is independent of R. So this family of schemes has a better download complexity and
per-server storage than Shah et al. [11, Section V], and is comparable in terms of both
the number of servers and total storage.
We remark that the above contruction still works if the sets of r servers are not
disjoint: the storage requirements of those servers in more than one r-set is increased,
but the download complexity and total storage are unaffected and the number of servers
required is reduced. So various trade-offs are possible using this technique.
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